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fix: Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup (GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)#10219

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mtrezza merged 3 commits intoparse-community:alphafrom
mtrezza:fix/GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v-v9
Mar 16, 2026
Merged

fix: Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup (GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)#10219
mtrezza merged 3 commits intoparse-community:alphafrom
mtrezza:fix/GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v-v9

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@mtrezza mtrezza commented Mar 16, 2026

Issue

Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup (GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)

Tasks

  • Add tests
  • Add changes
  • Add security check
  • Add benchmark

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parseplatformorg commented Mar 16, 2026

Snyk checks have passed. No issues have been found so far.

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coderabbitai bot commented Mar 16, 2026

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

Refines signup authData handling and validation: adds tests for empty/invalid authData cases and updates RestWrite to compute a hasAuthData flag, changing when and how authData is validated or short-circuited during user signup and related flows.

Changes

Cohort / File(s) Summary
Vulnerability tests
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js
Adds a new test suite "(GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v) Empty authData session issuance bypass" covering signup rejection for empty/null/invalid authData and allowance when username+password are provided.
AuthData validation logic
src/RestWrite.js
Introduces hasAuthData detection for meaningful provider entries; replaces previous authData-existence checks with provider-aware conditions, short-circuits handling for empty/falsy provider data, and refactors when handleAuthData/validation runs.

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
Participant Client
Participant RestWrite
Participant Providers
Participant Database

Client->>RestWrite: signup request (username?, password?, authData)
RestWrite->>RestWrite: compute hasAuthData (is any provider object with keys?)
alt hasAuthData true
    RestWrite->>Providers: validate provider authData
    Providers-->>RestWrite: validation result
    RestWrite->>Database: create user + session
    Database-->>RestWrite: created userId, sessionToken
    RestWrite-->>Client: 201 with objectId/sessionToken
else hasAuthData false
    alt username+password present
        RestWrite->>Database: create user + session (skip provider validation)
        Database-->>RestWrite: created userId, sessionToken
        RestWrite-->>Client: 201 with objectId/sessionToken
    else
        RestWrite-->>Client: 400 USERNAME_MISSING or UNSUPPORTED_SERVICE
    end
end
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Estimated code review effort

🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~45 minutes

Possibly related PRs

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 2 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name Status Explanation Resolution
Description check ⚠️ Warning The PR description is entirely empty, missing all required template sections including Issue, Approach, and Tasks checklist required by the repository template. Add a complete PR description following the template: include the Issue/link, describe the Approach with changes made, and check applicable Tasks (tests were added, document changes as needed).
✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Docstring Coverage ✅ Passed No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check.
Title check ✅ Passed The title clearly and specifically identifies the main change: fixing a security vulnerability (GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v) where empty authData was bypassing credential requirements during signup.

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Actionable comments posted: 1

🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js (1)

2938-2998: Strengthen rejection assertions to verify the intended failure path.

Using only toBeRejected() can mask false positives (any rejection passes). For security regression tests, assert status/error code/message.

✅ Example pattern
-      await expectAsync(
-        request({
-          method: 'POST',
-          url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/users',
-          headers: {
-            'Content-Type': 'application/json',
-            'X-Parse-Application-Id': 'test',
-            'X-Parse-REST-API-Key': 'rest',
-          },
-          body: JSON.stringify({ authData: {} }),
-        })
-      ).toBeRejected();
+      const res = await request({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/users',
+        headers: {
+          'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+          'X-Parse-Application-Id': 'test',
+          'X-Parse-REST-API-Key': 'rest',
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ authData: {} }),
+      }).catch(e => e);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.USERNAME_MISSING);
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js` around lines 2938 - 2998, The tests currently
use expectAsync(request(...)).toBeRejected() which only asserts any rejection;
update each failing test (the ones calling request POST /1/users with bodies
like { authData: {} }, { authData: { bogus: {} } }, and { authData: { bogus:
null } }) to explicitly verify the rejection reason: call request(...) inside a
try/catch (or use
expectAsync(...).toBeRejectedWith(jasmine.objectContaining(...))) and assert the
caught error contains the expected HTTP status (e.g., statusCode === 400 or
error.status === 400) and the response body/error message indicates invalid
authData or missing credentials so the test ensures the specific failure path
rather than any rejection.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In `@src/RestWrite.js`:
- Around line 472-474: The current guard uses hasAuthData to short-circuit
provider validation and skips validation for cases like { authData: { bogus: 'x'
} }; change the logic so that hasAuthData still gates credential flow but does
not bypass provider validation: only skip validation when the authData property
is entirely absent, and when authData exists ensure it's an object and run the
provider-specific validation (or reject if authData is present but not an
object). Update the conditional around hasAuthData /
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this.data, 'authData') so that provider
validation functions (the authData validation routine used in this file) are
invoked whenever this.data.authData exists and is an object, and treat
non-object authData as invalid instead of skipping validation.

---

Nitpick comments:
In `@spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js`:
- Around line 2938-2998: The tests currently use
expectAsync(request(...)).toBeRejected() which only asserts any rejection;
update each failing test (the ones calling request POST /1/users with bodies
like { authData: {} }, { authData: { bogus: {} } }, and { authData: { bogus:
null } }) to explicitly verify the rejection reason: call request(...) inside a
try/catch (or use
expectAsync(...).toBeRejectedWith(jasmine.objectContaining(...))) and assert the
caught error contains the expected HTTP status (e.g., statusCode === 400 or
error.status === 400) and the response body/error message indicates invalid
authData or missing credentials so the test ensures the specific failure path
rather than any rejection.
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ℹ️ Review info
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Run ID: 117f8a39-6a3b-4a1f-86e7-906391feb068

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 6476c57 and 96c6670.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)
  • spec/vulnerabilities.spec.js
  • src/RestWrite.js

mtrezza added 2 commits March 16, 2026 13:15
- Separate credential gating from provider validation skip
- Non-object authData values now still go through provider validation
- Strengthen test assertions with specific status codes and error codes
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codecov bot commented Mar 16, 2026

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 92.57%. Comparing base (84db0a0) to head (3074910).
⚠️ Report is 65 commits behind head on alpha.

Additional details and impacted files
@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##            alpha   #10219   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   92.57%   92.57%           
=======================================
  Files         192      192           
  Lines       16296    16300    +4     
  Branches      199      199           
=======================================
+ Hits        15086    15090    +4     
  Misses       1193     1193           
  Partials       17       17           

☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry.
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@mtrezza mtrezza changed the title fix: GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v v9 fix: Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup (GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v) Mar 16, 2026
@mtrezza mtrezza merged commit 5dcbf41 into parse-community:alpha Mar 16, 2026
22 of 24 checks passed
parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 16, 2026
# [9.6.0-alpha.29](9.6.0-alpha.28...9.6.0-alpha.29) (2026-03-16)

### Bug Fixes

* Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup ([GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v](GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)) ([#10219](#10219)) ([5dcbf41](5dcbf41))
parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 16, 2026
# [9.6.0-alpha.29](9.6.0-alpha.28...9.6.0-alpha.29) (2026-03-16)

### Bug Fixes

* Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup ([GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v](GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)) ([#10219](#10219)) ([5dcbf41](5dcbf41))
@parseplatformorg
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0-alpha.29

@parseplatformorg parseplatformorg added the state:released-alpha Released as alpha version label Mar 16, 2026
parseplatformorg pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2026
# [9.6.0](9.5.1...9.6.0) (2026-03-22)

### Bug Fixes

*  LiveQuery `regexTimeout` default value not applied ([#10156](#10156)) ([416cfbc](416cfbc))
* Account lockout race condition allows bypassing threshold via concurrent requests ([#10266](#10266)) ([ff70fee](ff70fee))
* Account takeover via operator injection in authentication data identifier ([GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87](GHSA-5fw2-8jcv-xh87)) ([#10185](#10185)) ([0d0a554](0d0a554))
* Add configurable batch request sub-request limit via option `requestComplexity.batchRequestLimit` ([#10265](#10265)) ([164ed0d](164ed0d))
* Auth data exposed via /users/me endpoint ([GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96](GHSA-37mj-c2wf-cx96)) ([#10278](#10278)) ([875cf10](875cf10))
* Auth provider validation bypass on login via partial authData ([GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr](GHSA-pfj7-wv7c-22pr)) ([#10246](#10246)) ([98f4ba5](98f4ba5))
* Block dot-notation updates to authData sub-fields and harden login provider checks ([#10223](#10223)) ([12c24c6](12c24c6))
* Bypass of class-level permissions in LiveQuery ([GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289](GHSA-7ch5-98q2-7289)) ([#10133](#10133)) ([98188d9](98188d9))
* Classes `_GraphQLConfig` and `_Audience` master key bypass via generic class routes ([GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c](GHSA-7xg7-rqf6-pw6c)) ([#10151](#10151)) ([1de4e43](1de4e43))
* Cloud function dispatch crashes server via prototype chain traversal ([GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4](GHSA-4263-jgmp-7pf4)) ([#10210](#10210)) ([286373d](286373d))
* Concurrent signup with same authentication creates duplicate users ([#10149](#10149)) ([853bfe1](853bfe1))
* Create CLP not enforced before user field validation on signup ([#10268](#10268)) ([a0530c2](a0530c2))
* Denial of service via unindexed database query for unconfigured auth providers ([GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr](GHSA-g4cf-xj29-wqqr)) ([#10270](#10270)) ([fbac847](fbac847))
* Denial-of-service via unbounded query complexity in REST and GraphQL API ([GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg](GHSA-cmj3-wx7h-ffvg)) ([#10130](#10130)) ([0ae9c25](0ae9c25))
* Email verification resend page leaks user existence (GHSA-h29g-q5c2-9h4f) ([#10238](#10238)) ([fbda4cb](fbda4cb))
* Empty authData bypasses credential requirement on signup ([GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v](GHSA-wjqw-r9x4-j59v)) ([#10219](#10219)) ([5dcbf41](5dcbf41))
* GraphQL WebSocket endpoint bypasses security middleware ([GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg](GHSA-p2x3-8689-cwpg)) ([#10189](#10189)) ([3ffba75](3ffba75))
* Incomplete JSON key escaping in PostgreSQL Increment on nested Object fields ([#10261](#10261)) ([a692873](a692873))
* Input type validation for query operators and batch path ([#10230](#10230)) ([a628911](a628911))
* Instance comparison with `instanceof` is not realm-safe ([#10225](#10225)) ([51efb1e](51efb1e))
* LDAP injection via unsanitized user input in DN and group filter construction ([GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c](GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c)) ([#10154](#10154)) ([5bbca7b](5bbca7b))
* LiveQuery bypasses CLP pointer permission enforcement ([GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576](GHSA-fph2-r4qg-9576)) ([#10250](#10250)) ([6c3317a](6c3317a))
* LiveQuery subscription query depth bypass ([GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6](GHSA-6qh5-m6g3-xhq6)) ([#10259](#10259)) ([2126fe4](2126fe4))
* LiveQuery subscription with invalid regular expression crashes server ([GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c](GHSA-827p-g5x5-h86c)) ([#10197](#10197)) ([0ae0eee](0ae0eee))
* Locale parameter path traversal in pages router ([#10242](#10242)) ([01fb6a9](01fb6a9))
* MFA recovery code single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp](GHSA-2299-ghjr-6vjp)) ([#10275](#10275)) ([5e70094](5e70094))
* MFA recovery codes not consumed after use ([GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8](GHSA-4hf6-3x24-c9m8)) ([#10170](#10170)) ([18abdd9](18abdd9))
* Missing audience validation in Keycloak authentication adapter ([GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v](GHSA-48mh-j4p5-7j9v)) ([#10137](#10137)) ([78ef1a1](78ef1a1))
* Normalize HTTP method case in `allowMethodOverride` middleware ([#10262](#10262)) ([a248e8c](a248e8c))
* NoSQL injection via token type in password reset and email verification endpoints ([GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588](GHSA-vgjh-hmwf-c588)) ([#10128](#10128)) ([b2f2317](b2f2317))
* OAuth2 adapter app ID validation sends wrong token to introspection endpoint ([GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2](GHSA-69xg-f649-w5g2)) ([#10187](#10187)) ([7f9f854](7f9f854))
* OAuth2 adapter shares mutable state across providers via singleton instance ([GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892](GHSA-2cjm-2gwv-m892)) ([#10183](#10183)) ([6009bc1](6009bc1))
* Parse Server OAuth2 authentication adapter account takeover via identity spoofing ([GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596](GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596)) ([#10145](#10145)) ([9cfd06e](9cfd06e))
* Parse Server role escalation and CLP bypass via direct `_Join table write ([GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc](GHSA-5f92-jrq3-28rc)) ([#10141](#10141)) ([22faa08](22faa08))
* Parse Server session token exfiltration via `redirectClassNameForKey` query parameter ([GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f](GHSA-6r2j-cxgf-495f)) ([#10143](#10143)) ([70b7b07](70b7b07))
* Password reset token single-use bypass via concurrent requests ([GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh](GHSA-r3xq-68wh-gwvh)) ([#10216](#10216)) ([84db0a0](84db0a0))
* Protected field change detection oracle via LiveQuery watch parameter ([GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm](GHSA-qpc3-fg4j-8hgm)) ([#10253](#10253)) ([0c0a0a5](0c0a0a5))
* Protected fields bypass via dot-notation in query and sort ([GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g](GHSA-r2m8-pxm9-9c4g)) ([#10167](#10167)) ([8f54c54](8f54c54))
* Protected fields bypass via LiveQuery subscription WHERE clause ([GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q](GHSA-j7mm-f4rv-6q6q)) ([#10175](#10175)) ([4d48847](4d48847))
* Protected fields bypass via logical query operators ([GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv](GHSA-72hp-qff8-4pvv)) ([#10140](#10140)) ([be1d65d](be1d65d))
* Protected fields leak via LiveQuery afterEvent trigger ([GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff](GHSA-5hmj-jcgp-6hff)) ([#10232](#10232)) ([6648500](6648500))
* Query condition depth bypass via pre-validation transform pipeline ([GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j](GHSA-9fjp-q3c4-6w3j)) ([#10257](#10257)) ([85994ef](85994ef))
* Rate limit bypass via batch request endpoint ([GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228](GHSA-775h-3xrc-c228)) ([#10147](#10147)) ([2766f4f](2766f4f))
* Rate limit bypass via HTTP method override and batch method spoofing ([#10234](#10234)) ([7d72d26](7d72d26))
* Rate limit user zone key fallback and batch request bypass ([#10214](#10214)) ([434ecbe](434ecbe))
* Revert accidental breaking default values for query complexity limits ([#10205](#10205)) ([ab8dd54](ab8dd54))
* Sanitize control characters in page parameter response headers ([#10237](#10237)) ([337ffd6](337ffd6))
* Schema poisoning via prototype pollution in deep copy ([GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf](GHSA-9ccr-fpp6-78qf)) ([#10200](#10200)) ([b321423](b321423))
* Security fix fast-xml-parser from 5.5.5 to 5.5.6 ([#10235](#10235)) ([f521576](f521576))
* Security upgrade fast-xml-parser from 5.3.7 to 5.4.2 ([#10086](#10086)) ([b04ca5e](b04ca5e))
* Server crash via deeply nested query condition operators ([GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v](GHSA-9xp9-j92r-p88v)) ([#10202](#10202)) ([f44e306](f44e306))
* Session creation endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg](GHSA-5v7g-9h8f-8pgg)) ([#10195](#10195)) ([7ccfb97](7ccfb97))
* Session token expiration unchecked on cache hit ([#10194](#10194)) ([a944203](a944203))
* Session update endpoint allows overwriting server-generated session fields ([GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q](GHSA-jc39-686j-wp6q)) ([#10263](#10263)) ([ea68fc0](ea68fc0))
* SQL injection via `Increment` operation on nested object field in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg](GHSA-q3vj-96h2-gwvg)) ([#10161](#10161)) ([8f82282](8f82282))
* SQL injection via aggregate and distinct field names in PostgreSQL adapter ([GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3](GHSA-p2w6-rmh7-w8q3)) ([#10272](#10272)) ([bdddab5](bdddab5))
* SQL injection via dot-notation field name in PostgreSQL ([GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27](GHSA-qpr4-jrj4-6f27)) ([#10159](#10159)) ([ea538a4](ea538a4))
* SQL Injection via dot-notation sub-key name in `Increment` operation on PostgreSQL ([GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h](GHSA-gqpp-xgvh-9h7h)) ([#10165](#10165)) ([169d692](169d692))
* SQL injection via query field name when using PostgreSQL ([GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6](GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6)) ([#10181](#10181)) ([be281b1](be281b1))
* Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) via SVG file upload ([GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww](GHSA-hcj7-6gxh-24ww)) ([#10136](#10136)) ([93b784d](93b784d))
* Stored XSS filter bypass via Content-Type MIME parameter and missing XML extension blocklist entries ([GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72](GHSA-42ph-pf9q-cr72)) ([#10191](#10191)) ([4f53ab3](4f53ab3))
* Stored XSS via file upload of HTML-renderable file types ([GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv](GHSA-v5hf-f4c3-m5rv)) ([#10162](#10162)) ([03287cf](03287cf))
* User enumeration via email verification endpoint ([GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856](GHSA-w54v-hf9p-8856)) ([#10172](#10172)) ([936abd4](936abd4))
* Validate authData provider values in challenge endpoint ([#10224](#10224)) ([e5e1f5b](e5e1f5b))
* Validate body field types in request middleware ([#10209](#10209)) ([df69046](df69046))
* Validate session in middleware for non-GET requests to `/sessions/me` ([#10213](#10213)) ([2a9fdab](2a9fdab))
* Validate token type in PagesRouter to prevent type confusion errors ([#10212](#10212)) ([386a989](386a989))

### Features

* Add `enableProductPurchaseLegacyApi` option to disable legacy IAP validation ([#10228](#10228)) ([622ee85](622ee85))
* Add `protectedFieldsOwnerExempt` option to control `_User` class owner exemption for `protectedFields` ([#10280](#10280)) ([d5213f8](d5213f8))
* Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header and customizable response headers for files via `Parse.Cloud.afterFind(Parse.File)` ([#10158](#10158)) ([28d11a3](28d11a3))
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🎉 This change has been released in version 9.6.0

@parseplatformorg parseplatformorg added the state:released Released as stable version label Mar 22, 2026
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